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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the redistributive impacts of rural taxation in China, using the CASS 
CHIP survey 1995-2002. The main findings can be summarized as follows.First, the major 
policy target of rural taxation reform--reducing the average rate of taxes and levies--was 
accomplished between 1995 and 2002, with favorable redistributive results. When the 
aggregate scene is observed, the disequalizing redistributive impact of taxation declined 
between 1995 and 2002. Second, despite these positive results from the aggregate perspective, 
the favorable impact of the reform was severely limited because overall rural taxation 
remained disequalizing after the reform and regressivity in taxation itself, measured by the 
Kakwani index and the income elasticity of taxation, increased between 1995 and 2002. The 
favorable change in the redistributive impact between these years did not occur as a result of a 
decrease in the degree of regressivity of the tax itself, but because the average rate of taxation 
and before-tax income inequality declined. Moreover, when the regional picture is observed, 
the overall redistributive impact of taxation worsened in several provinces following the 
reform. 
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  1I. Introduction 
A. Setting the Agenda 
  “The agricultural tax has become history” (People’s Daily, December 31, 2005). The 
Chinese government announced abolition of agricultural taxes on January 1, 2006.
1 This was a 
goal of the “rural tax and fee reform” (hereafter referred to as rural taxation reform) initiated in 
the late 1990s and also an important turning point in rural public policy in China. This paper 
examines the redistributive impact of rural taxation using the 1995 and 2002 CASS CHIP 
household surveys and the administrative village survey of 2002.
2 The analytical focus is on 
changes in tax regressivity between 1995 and 2002. 
  An empirical study of the redistributive impact of rural taxation is important not only 
because ad hoc collection of taxes and levies - - so-called “arbitrary charges, fines, and levies” 
(luan shoufei, luan fakuan, luan tanpai) - - has been one of the hottest issues in rural public 
policy throughout the 1990s, but also because a critical aspect of the Chinese local 
politico-economic system, that is, the multilayered and decentralized local 
administrative/fiscal system, is embodied in the issue. So far, however, few empirical studies, 
with the exception of a few such as Khan and Riskin (forthcoming), and Tao, Liu, and Zhang 
(2003), have used nationally representative microdata to examine the redistributive outcomes 
of rural taxation.
3  
  The structure of this paper is as follows. In the latter half of this section, the 
background of the topic is discussed. Then, Section II summarizes the process of rural taxation 
reform. Section III presents the definitions of taxes and levies to be employed in the study and 
introduces measurements of the redistributive impact of taxation. Section IV reports the 
changes in the amount and rate of taxation between 1995 and 2002 and then draws national 
and regional pictures of the redistributive impact of rural taxation. Section V concludes the 
paper. Note that “rural taxation” is used here to refer to both formal state taxation and various 
kinds of levies and fees collected at the local level. Detailed definitions of the taxes, levies, 
  2and fees mentioned in this paper are provided in Section III. 
 
B. A Decentralized Fiscal System and Its Consequences 
  China’s local administrative/fiscal system can be characterized as a multilayered and 
decentralized system (Wong et al. 2003). Interregional disparities in the revenue-raising 
abilities of local governments at all the administrative levels, namely the provincial, 
subprovincial (city/prefecture, shi/diqu), county (xian/xianjishi), and township (xiang/zhen) 
levels, are large. Despite the large interregional disparities in local revenue, the provision of 
most basic public services, such as education, public health, and infrastructure, has been 
assigned to local governments. For example, from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, in rural 
areas most of the fiscal burden of basic education has fallen on township and administrative 
village authorities. Such a decentralized system of public service delivery has not been 
accompanied by an effective mechanism of intergovernmental fiscal transfer, especially at the 
subprovincial and county levels. Three consequences derive from this malfunction of the local 
fiscal system: first, strong interhousehold/interregional regressivity in rural taxation; second, 
huge interregional disparities in the quality of small-scale infrastructure and public services; 
and third, strong characteristics of underinstitutionalized rural taxation. This paper focuses on 
the first consequence, regressive taxation in rural areas.
4
  Based on the 1995 household data set, Table1 reports the average rate of taxation by 
income quantile and decile in 1995. Although the average rate of taxation for all households 
was not particularly high at 5.4 percent of before-tax income, the burden fell very heavily on 
lower-income households. It should be noted that tax regressivity was stronger for local levies 
and fees (fei) collected at the township/administrative village level than it was for formal state 
taxation (shui). Local levies and fees were highly regressive because most of them were poll 
taxes imposed on a per capita (household) basis or a per arable land basis. Formal state 
taxation was also regressive due to the unique characteristics of the agricultural tax (nongye 
  3shui) that was universal in rural areas. As described in Sections 3 and 4, the agricultural tax is 
only partly sensitive to agricultural income and is not sensitive to nonagricultural income. As a 
result, the tax burden has been heavier for lower-income groups (regions) that depend heavily 
on agriculture. 
  Typically, the consequences outlined above have been expressed in situations at the 
village level, the lowest stratum of the administrative hierarchy. No formal public budget has 
existed at the administrative village level because it has been regarded as a self-governing 
community, not a formal governmental apparatus. The administrative village however, has 
been acting as a de facto governmental apparatus. Throughout the 1990s, administrative 
village funds for public services were collected mainly through the administrative village levy 
(cun tiliu) that had a legal basis in the agricultural law of 1993. The levy for rural education 
(nongcun jiaoyu jizi) introduced in the 1990s was also legal. In addition to these items, many 
of the villages in lower-income regions have depended on various other levies, fees, fines, and 
compulsory investments/donations that are of dubious legality. By contrast, villages with their 
own revenue sources have collected little money from villagers. Moreover, it should be noted 
that administrative villages have had the responsibility for collecting levies, fees, fines, and 
compulsory investments/donations imposed by the township government and various 
government departments at the county level. Conflicts between village cadres and villagers 
over taxation have been considered to be the main causes of political instability in rural areas 
(Bernstein and Lü 2003). 
 
II. Overview of Rural Taxation Reform in the 1990s 
A. A Brief Chronology 
  Current rural taxation reform dates back to the beginning of the 1990s. The focus of the 
policy was to set a limit on the peasants’ tax burden (less than 5 percent of the per capita 
annual net income of the previous year). However, the impact of the policy was limited, and 
  4the overburden of the peasants’ taxes and levies remained a crucial problem in rural China. At 
the end of the 1990s, the Party and the central government began to adopt a more 
comprehensive approach aimed at reducing the peasants’ tax burden. As is summarized in 
Table 2, the reform process after the end of the 1990s can be divided into two phases: phase-1 
substitution of local levies with formal taxation (feigaishui), and phase-2 gradual abolition of 
agricultural taxes.
5
 Phase-1 In 2000, Anhui Province was designated as the national model area (shidian) 
of the reform (Zhonggong Zhongyang and Guowuyuan 2000). In March 2002, the Party and 
the central government expanded coverage of the reform. Most of the provinces (and 
equivalent administrative units) had launched the reform by the end of 2002. 
  The basic policy arrangement in the phase-1 reform is summarized as “three abolitions, 
two adjustments, and one reform” (sange quxiao, liangge tiaozheng, yige gaige). The term 
“three abolitions” refers to the termination of the township levy (xiangzhen tongchou), the 
levy for rural education, and other levies, fees, and compulsory investments/donations 
collected directly from peasants by local governments. The term “two adjustments” refers to 
changes to the agricultural tax and the special agricultural tax (nongye techan shui). The “one 
reform” indicates reform of the collection and usage of the administrative village levy. In 
addition, it was announced that the slaughter tax (tuzai shui) would be terminated. 
Compulsory unpaid labor (yiwugong, laodong jileigong), which is imposed by local 
governments as an in-kind local levy, was to be abolished gradually. 
  Adjustment of the agricultural tax had two components. The first component was the 
upward adjustment of the actual tax rate from approximately 2.5 percent to the maximum rate 
of 7 percent, intended to compensate for the expected decline in the fiscal revenue of local, 
mainly township, governments, caused by the reform.
6 The second component was the 
introduction of an additional levy of agricultural tax and special agricultural tax (liangshui 
fujia) as a substitute for levies and fees at the administrative village level (hereafter referred to 
  5as the “additional levy on agricultural taxes”). The standard rate of the additional levy on 
agricultural taxes was 20 percent of the amount of agricultural taxes. 
  Phase-2 The reform policy has accelerated sharply after 2004. It shows that the 
Chinese leadership began to change the urban-biased institutional arrangements inherited 
from the planned economy era. It is stressing that “unified institutional and policy 
arrangements for urban and rural development” (tongchou chengxiang) are critical to 
sustaining economic development and social stability, not only at the rural level, but also at the 
national level (see, for example, the decision of the 
Third Plenum of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, People’s Daily, October 22, 2003). 
The Party “Document Number One” (yihao wenjian), which was released at the beginning of 
2004, declared that the agricultural tax rate should be lowered immediately and abolished 
gradually (Zhonggong Zhongyang and Guowuyuan 2004). In March, 2004, the State Council 
announced it would abolish agricultural taxes gradually within the next five years, excluding 
special agricultural taxes on tobacco and a few other products. The number of provinces that 
have abolished agricultural taxes was eight in 2004, including Heilongjiang and Jilin, which 
were chosen as the national model provinces for the reform. By September, 2005, 28 
provinces had abolished agricultural taxes. Many counties in three other provinces (Hebei, 
Shandong, Yunnan) also stopped collecting agricultural taxes in 2005. On December 29, 2005, 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress voted that agricultural taxes 
should be abolished on January 1, 2006. The abolition of agricultural taxes was thus 
completed before the original target date. 
  The 2002 CASS survey illustrates the situation in the phase-1 reform. As reported in 
the Appendix Table to this paper, of the 122 counties surveyed, 84 counties, or approximately 
70 percent of the sample counties, were categorized into counties where the phase-1 reform 
had already been launched in 2002 (hereafter referred to as post-reform counties). Another 38 
counties had not yet started the phase-1 reform (hereafter referred to as pre-reform counties). 
  6Although data limitations do not allow us directly to describe the redistributive impact of 
abolition of agricultural taxes, we are still able to investigate to what degree rural taxation 
influences income inequality during the 1990s and for what reason the reform should be 
launched. We can also extend our discussion to phase-2 and derive implications for rural 
public policy in the “post-agricultural tax era” (hou nongyeshui shidai). 
 
B. Regional Variation 
  During the phase-1 reform, considering the complexity of the issue, the Party and the 
central government took a gradual and rather decentralized approach to rural taxation reform. 
As a result, considerable regional variations can be seen in the implementation of the reform 
program. The coverage of reform within particular provinces depended greatly on the policy 
of the provincial authorities. The unit of policy implementation was the county and the rate of 
agricultural taxes was set at the county level. A region (a province or county) in good financial 
condition could lower the tax rate, whereas lower-income regions, or purely agricultural 
regions, where local governments rely heavily on agricultural taxes, insisted on setting the 
maximum rate. 
  This raises the question of what factors affected the provincial governments’ decisions 
regarding the counties in which taxation reform was to be launched. We assume two 
background factors influenced policy choice: first, the need for reform; and second, the 
relative ease of reform. Although the two factors overlap, the following working hypothesis 
can be established. 
  The need for reform in the counties is indicated by the average rate of taxation. The 
heavier the peasants’ tax burden, the greater the need for reform. Another factor representing 
the need for reform is the fiscal structure of local governments. The smaller the size of fiscal 
expenditure for rural public services, the greater the need for reform because more taxation for 
fewer service deliveries is a potential source of socio-political instability. This factor controls 
  7the average rate of taxation and the level of regional income. 
  Concerning the relative ease of reform, we take two factors into consideration. One is 
the revenue-raising ability of each administrative village. Provincial governments will be 
more confident about conducting reform in a certain county if the administrative villages 
belonging to that county have the ability to raise funds using methods other than the collection 
of levies directly from villagers. County officials and village cadres will be able to accept the 
reform policy more readily when their village budgets can be expanded by the ability to raise 
funds. The other factor representing the ease of reform is the level of regional income. With 
other variables remaining the same, a higher regional income makes it easier to conduct 
reform because local governments in higher-income regions have the potential to exploit new 
revenue sources. 
  To test this working hypothesis, a village-based probit estimation was conducted using 
the administrative village survey and official fiscal statistics at the county level. The 
dependent variable was the status of reform at the end of 2002, that is, whether the sample 
villages are post-reform villages (= 1) or pre-reform villages (= 0). Of the 961 administrative 
villages surveyed, 676 were post-reform villages and 285 were pre-reform villages. With 
regard to the need for reform, three explanatory variables were employed, all measured in 
yuan: (a) the log of the per capita amount of local levies and fees, excluding unpaid labor; (b) 
the log of the per capita amount of a county’s budgetary fiscal expenditure for rural public 
services; and (c) the log of the per capita amount of village expenditure on public services and 
infrastructure. With regard to the relative ease of reform, we used (d) the log of the per capita 
amount of revenue from the villages’ own revenue sources, and (e) the log of the per capita 
annual household net income averaged at the county level, both measured in yuan. In addition 
to these variables, a dummy variable for nationally designated poor counties (pinkunxian) was 
employed to control policy factors specific to such countries. The reference year was 1998 for 
all explanatory variables. 
  8  Table 3 reports the estimation outcomes, indicating that the above working hypothesis 
was consistent with the evidence and that both the need for, and the relative ease of, reform 
underlay the policy choice. The reforms were more likely to be launched where the need for 
reform was higher, that is, where the level of the tax burden was heavier, but where the amount 
of public service provision was small compared with the level of the tax burden. Further, 
assuming the same degree of need for reform, the potential of local governments to absorb the 
negative impact of reform in their budgets appeared to be important when launching reform. In 
addition, the presence of a poverty alleviation program sponsored by the national level proved 
to affect the policy choice. 
 
III. Definitions of Taxes and Measurements of the Redistributive Impact of Taxation 
A. Definitions of Taxes and Levies 
  Table 4 summarizes the definitions of taxes, levies, and fees employed in this paper. 
Two categories, state taxation and local quasi-tax, are employed. 
(a) State taxation 
  State taxation is classified into two subcategories: taxation on primary industries and 
taxation on secondary/tertiary industries.
7 The first category includes the agricultural tax, the 
special agricultural tax, the livestock tax, and the slaughter tax. The second category includes 
taxation on manufacturing, construction, commerce, and other service industries. 
(b) Local quasi-tax 
  We use the term local quasi-tax as a general term for various local levies, fees, and 
compulsory investments/donations imposed at the township and administrative village levels. 
In addition, the term encompasses various fees collected by the county government through 
township/village officials. Note that in the following empirical analyses, any additional levy 
on agricultural taxes belongs in the category of local levies rather than the state taxation 
category because they are employed as substitutes for the administrative village levy. As the 
  9characteristics of the local quasi-tax vary greatly, it is convenient to classify it into the 
following two subcategories. 
  (b-1) The local quasi-tax narrowly defined: the additional levy on agricultural taxes, 
the village levy, the township levy, the levy for rural education, the “one issue, one discussion 
levy (yishi yiyi chouzi)” (a newly employed levy at the administrative village level, the 
amount of which will be set by the villagers on the basis of democratic discussion), and other 
levies, fees, and compulsory investments/donations. 
  (b-2) The local quasi-tax broadly defined: the narrowly defined local quasi-tax plus 
unpaid labor. Unpaid labor (UPL) is calculated as follows: 
  UPL = (w*LD) + C,  (1) 
where w denotes wages per day for temporary labor in each administrative village in which the 
sample households lived, as calculated from the administrative village survey, LD denotes 
annual labor days of unpaid labor, and C denotes the total amount of cash paid by households 
as a substitute for unpaid labor (yiqian daigong). As mentioned below, unpaid labor has a 
strong impact on the peasants’ tax burden.
8 Note that the narrowly defined local quasi-tax is 
used in the comparison of 1995 and 2002 because data on unpaid labor are not available from 
the 1995 CASS survey. 
 
B. Measurements of the Redistributive Impact and Regressivity 
  The basic method of evaluating the total redistributive impact of taxation is to compare 
the inequality of before-tax income with after-tax income. The total redistributive effect of 
taxation can be measured as the change in the inequality index, for example, the Gini 
coefficient, caused by the taxation. The change in inequality can be measured both in absolute 
and relative terms. 
  A classical measurement of the change in inequality in absolute terms is the Musgrave 
and Thin measure (MT) (Musgrave and Thin 1948):  
  10  MT = G – G*,  (2) 
where G and G* are the before-tax income and after-tax income Gini coefficients, respectively. 
A positive (negative) MT indicates a progressive (regressive) taxation and a positive 
(negative) redistributive impact of taxation (Musgrave and Thin 1948). In relative terms, the 
redistributive impact can be measured by a redistribution coefficient. The redistribution 
coefficient (R) is measured as follows: 
  R = MT/G *100(%).  (3) 
  A disadvantage of MT is that it does not reveal changes in the ranking of individuals 
or households by income after taxation. When MT equals zero, there are two possibilities: 
either everyone is paying the same tax rate, or the richest and the poorest sections of society 
have exchanged their rankings because of a very high tax rate for the former. In the latter 
case, although there is a highly progressive regressive taxation system, it is not reflected in 
MT.
9 However, this weakness may not be critical in our analysis because of the obvious 
regressivity of taxation in rural China. A regressive tax would not change the ranking of 
individuals in terms of the distribution of after-tax income. 
  Another popular measurement is the Kakwani index of tax progressivity. The Kakwani 
index P is defined as: 
  P = C – G,  (4) 
where C is the concentration index of taxes and G is the Gini coefficient of the before-tax 
income (Kakwani 1977). A positive value of P implies progressive taxation and a positive 
redistributive impact on income inequality, and vice versa. 
  MT can be rewritten as follows, using the Kakwani index (World Bank 2003): 
  MT = P[t/(1 – t)],  (5) 
where t is the average rate of taxation as a proportion of before-tax income. Then, after-tax 
income inequality is: 
  G* = G – P[t/(1 – t)].  (6) 
  11That is, after-tax income inequality (G*) is a function of the average rate of taxation (t), the 
Kakwani index (P), and the before-tax income inequality (G). When taxation is regressive 
(when P has a negative value), the smaller the average rate of taxation, the more equitable is 
the after-tax income distribution. In other words, the smaller the absolute value of P, the 
smaller will be the after-tax income inequality. 
 
IV. The Redistributive Impact of Rural Taxation Reform, 1995–2002 
A. The Amount and Rate of Taxation 
  In this section, we evaluate the redistributive impact of rural taxation reform using the 
1995 and 2002 CASS household data sets. In the following empirical examination, the sample 
counties are divided into post-reform counties and pre-reform counties. To ensure 
comparability between 1995 and 2002, Guizhou, Guangxi, and Xinjiang are not included. This 
is because all 1995 tax-related data are missing for Guizhou, and Guangxi and Xinjiang are not 
covered in the 1995 survey. A total of 78 counties fall into the category of post-reform 
counties, where taxation reform has been launched in the whole area. The post-reform 
counties are distributed over 18 provinces. A total of 23 counties in which reform has not been 
launched are categorized as pre-reform counties. Pre-reform counties are distributed over six 
provinces. (For the distribution of post- and pre-reform counties, see the appendix table to this 
paper). Changes in the amount and rate of taxation between 1995 and 2002 are summarized in 
Table 5. 
  For rural China as a whole, the peasants’ total burden, the sum of state taxation and the 
narrowly defined local quasi-tax, declined from 1995 to 2002 in terms of both the absolute 
value of taxes and levies and the rate of taxation. (All the figures relating to taxation in 2002 
are deflated to 1995 prices using the consumer price index for rural households at the 
provincial level). Observing the aggregate scene, the major policy target of the taxation reform, 
which was a reduction in the average rate of taxation, was accomplished. 
  12  A large decline in the average rate of taxation is found in the post-reform counties 
(Table 5b). The average rate of taxation declined from 6 percent in 1995 to 3.4 percent in 2002. 
Two trends -- the increase of state taxation and the decrease of local quasi-taxes -- lie behind 
this change. The average rate of narrowly defined local quasi-tax decreased from 4.2 percent 
in 1995 to 1 percent in 2002. If the additional 0.4 percent levy for agricultural taxes is 
excluded, the average rate has dropped to 0.6 percent. The policy framework of “replacing 
local levies with formal taxation” was accomplished. However, the average rate of the unpaid 
labor tax was the same as that of the narrowly defined local quasi-tax, excluding the additional 
levy on agricultural taxes. Unpaid labor remained significant even after the reform. 
  In contrast to post-reform counties, the absolute level of the peasants’ total burden in 
the pre-reform counties rose by about 10 percent between 1995 and 2002 (Table 5c). The 
decline in the rate of taxation in the pre-reform area is more a product of income growth than 
of changes in the level of taxation. 
  When comparing post- and pre-reform counties as discussed above, the level of 
taxation in 1995 was higher in the areas that carried out the reforms by 2002 than it was in the 
areas where reform had not yet taken place by 2002. Notably, this pattern did not change by 
2002 after the reform was implemented in some counties (Tables 5b and 5c). 
 
B. Changes in the Redistributive Impact 
  The rural taxation reform affected the distribution as well as the average rate of 
taxation. Of particular interest here is whether the reform changed the regressivity of rural 
taxation. Table 6, which focuses on the post-reform counties, summarizes the changes in 
regressivity and the redistributive impact of taxation between 1995 and 2002. The following 
points can be made. 
  First, concerning the total redistributive impact of taxation, the disequalizing effect has 
decreased over the period, although a disequalizing redistributive impact remains. As seen in 
  13Table 6a, the Musgrave and Thin measure of the total burden has decreased from –0.016 to 
–0.009, and the redistribution coefficient has declined from –4.5 percent to –2.6 percent. This 
is the outcome of two different trends shown in Tables 6b and 6c, namely the alleviation of the 
unfavorable redistributive impact in local quasi-tax (reflected in the change in the 
redistributive coefficient from –3.3 percent to –0.8 percent) and the worsening of the negative 
impact in state taxation (reflected in the change in the redistributive coefficient from –0.9 
percent to –1.6 percent).
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  Second, in spite of some alleviation of the unfavorable redistributive impact of 
taxation as shown in Table 6, the regressivity of taxation itself increased between 1995 and 
2002. For the total tax burden, the concentration index changed from 0.140 to 0.110 and the 
Kakwani index changed from –0.217 to –0.226. Both these changes indicate a worsening of 
regressivity. Therefore, the favorable change in the total redistributive impact of taxation 
between 1995 and 2002 shown in Table 6 was the combined result of a reduction in the 
average rate of taxation and a more equal before-tax income distribution. Hence, the 
redistributive impact of the rural taxation reform was mixed. 
 
C. A Comparison of Post- and Pre-reform Counties 
  Table 7 shows the comparisons of the redistributive effects of taxation in post-reform 
and pre-reform areas in 2002. The broader definition including unpaid labor is used for local 
quasi-tax. The table reveals that taxes were less regressive in post-reform counties than in 
pre-reform counties, but this was offset by a higher average rate of taxation. Consequently, the 
overall redistributive impact of taxes was more unfavorable in post-reform counties than in 
pre-reform counties. It is notable that unpaid labor was an important source of tax regressivity 
in pre-reform counties. Although unpaid labor has not attracted much attention in previous 
studies, we suggest that it is highly significant because local governments in low-income 
regions tend to depend greatly on unpaid labor to finance infrastructure construction. Thus, the 
  14abolition of unpaid labor is an important component of the taxation reform. 
 
D. Tax and the Income of Primary Industry 
  So far, the relationship between total income and taxation has been examined. Another 
interesting issue is the degree to which the taxation of primary industry is sensitive to primary 
industry income. Table 8 reports the outcome for the post-reform counties. 
  First, in 1995, tax regressivity in the case of income from primary industry is even 
higher than it was in the case of total income (see Tables 6 and 8). This finding reveals that the 
agricultural tax formula before the reform did not adequately reflect differences in agricultural 
productivity or the structure of agricultural production. As a result, the agricultural tax rate 
was lower for regions/households with higher agricultural profitability. 
  Second, the degree of regressivity measured by the Kakwani index declined between 
1995 and 2002, in contrast to the case of total income in relation to total state taxation. The 
decrease in tax regressivity in 2002 suggests that the newly defined agricultural tax formula 
reflects agricultural profitability more adequately than did the old formula. 
 
E. Interregional and Intraregional Regressivity 
  Regressivity in taxation can be separated into interregional regressivity and 
intraregional regressivity. One way to separate these two types of regressivity is to estimate 
the income elasticity of taxation with respect to both household and regional average incomes. 
Taxation is progressive when the income elasticity of taxes is greater than one and regressive 
when the elasticity is less than one. Negative elasticity indicates stronger regressivity. 
  Table 9 reports the OLS estimation of intraregional and interregional income elasticity 
in the post-reform counties. The dependent variables are the log of the per capita amount of 
total state taxation and the narrowly defined local quasi-tax. The independent variables are: 
the log of the per capita before-tax household income which is used to capture intraregional 
  15regressivity, and the log of the per capita before-tax income averaged at the county level, 
which is used to capture interregional regressivity. 
  Two points can be made from Table 9. First, both interregional and intraregional 
regressivities increased after the reform, as income elasticity declined between 1995 and 2002, 
and in both years it was less than one. Second, interregional regressivity was greater than 
intraregional regressivity for both state taxation and local quasi-tax. Notably, between 1995 
and 2002, the increase in the interregional regressivity of state taxation was remarkable. This 
finding reflects a basic problem of the taxation reform, which was that the rates of agricultural 
taxes were decided at the county level, and the variables used for calculating the tax were 
subject to political manipulation. It is likely that officials of poor counties with small public 
budgets had strong incentives to set higher tax rates. 
 
F. Regional Variation in the Changes in Tax Regressivity 
  So far, we have provided a general picture of the redistributive impact of rural taxation 
reform. Given the huge regional imbalance in local public finance and the decentralized 
manner of taxation reform, it is useful to examine the regional variation in the redistributive 
impact of this reform. 
  Table 10 reports the redistributive impact of the reform at provincial level, focusing on 
provinces in which all counties have undergone reform. Changes in the redistributive impact 
of taxation varied considerably. Five of the 11 post-reform provinces covered in the study -- 
Hebei, Jiangxi, Hunan, Shaanxi, and Gansu -- experienced unfavorable changes in the 
redistributive impact between 1995 and 2002, whereas six other provinces -- Jilin, Jiangsu, 
Anhui, Shandong, Henan, and Hubei -- had favorable changes during the same period. 
  Table 11 shows the changes in the average rate of taxation by income decile groups 
between 1995 and 2002, focusing on four provinces that experienced unfavorable changes in 
the redistributive impact of taxation. The table confirms that the total taxation burden 
  16increased for the bottom 10 percent income decile group between 1995 and 2002 in all four 
provinces. Ironically, given its aims, the reform disadvantaged lower-income groups and 
regions in these provinces. 
  In conclusion, the decentralized manner of taxation reform has resulted in considerable 
regional disparity in the redistributive impact of taxation reform. The focus on decreasing the 
average rate of taxation has resulted in neglect of the unfavorable redistributive impact of 
taxation reform at the local level. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  This paper has evaluated the redistributive impacts of rural taxation. The main findings 
of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the major policy target of rural taxation 
reform - - reducing the average rate of taxes and levies - - was accomplished between 1995 and 
2002, with favorable redistributive results (see also Chapter 3 in Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 
forthcoming). When the aggregate scene is observed, the disequalizing redistributive impact 
of taxation declined between 1995 and 2002. Second, despite these positive results from the 
aggregate perspective, the favorable impact of the reform was severely limited because overall 
rural taxation remained disequalizing after the reform and regressivity in taxation itself, 
measured by the Kakwani index and the income elasticity of taxation, increased between 1995 
and 2002. The favorable change in the redistributive impact between these years did not occur 
as a result of a decrease in the degree of regressivity of the tax itself, but because the average 
rate of taxation and before-tax income inequality declined. Moreover, when the regional 
picture is observed, the overall redistributive impact of taxation worsened in several provinces 
following the reform. 
  These empirical findings reflect that, under the decentralized fiscal/administrative 
system, a public policy launched by the central government can bring about considerable 
regional disparity in its outcomes. In the case of the rural taxation reform, confining policy 
  17attention to the average rate of taxation (or the per capita tax burden), the only operational and 
monitorable policy target for the central government, has not achieved a favorable impact at 
the local level. In this context, the abolition of agricultural taxes is a natural and necessary 
extension of the reform policy. We should not, however, be overly optimistic about the policy 
outcomes of the reform. If the abolition of agricultural tax is not accompanied by a fiscal 
transfer to local governments and other fiscal policy adjustments, deterioration in public 
service delivery could occur. As is discussed in Sato (forthcoming), our empirical study 
provides evidence for such unfavorable consequences. Tao, Liu, and Zhang (2003) also argue 
that the decrease of the peasants’ tax burden has not been accompanied by a systematic policy 
framework for public service provision at the local level. Although the abolition of 
agricultural taxes and quasi-taxes will have an equalizing impact for rural income inequality in 
the short run, if it brings about a cutback of basic public services, it may harm regional 
economic growth and have disequalizing effects in the long run.
11 Moreover, if the township- 
and village-level governmental apparatuses are not financed adequately, they will continue to 
collect money from peasants informally and rural taxation may be driven underground once 
again. 
  As the next step, empirical studies should focus on the flow of local public finance 
following the reform and investigate the degree to which the reform has influenced the 
delivery of local public goods. Moreover, this question should be examined from the 
standpoint of long-term institution building in rural areas. That is, we should investigate the 
relationship between tax policy and other complementary reform policies such as the 
restructuring of local administrative systems, the promotion of “village democracy”, and the 
introduction of social security programs for the rural population. 
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1. See Table 3 for definitions of state taxation and local quasi-tax narrowly defined. The average 
rate of taxation is calculated as (the sum of taxes, levies and fees)/(before-tax household 
income)*100. 
2. Eighteen of the 19 provinces covered by the 1995 CASS survey are used in the calculation. 
Guizhou is not included because data for taxes and levies are missing. For a description of 
provinces covered in this paper, see Appendix Table A. 
  24Table 2 The Structure of Taxation Reform  
  Phase-1 (2000–2003)  Phase-2 (2004–) 
Reform policy  Substitution of local levies with 
formal taxation 
Gradual abolition of agricultural 
taxes 
Agricultural taxes        To raise rate of taxation to cover 
the decline in fiscal revenue of local 
governments caused by the abolition 
of local levies (maximum tax rate: 
7%). 
    To employ an additional levy on 
agricultural taxes as a substitute for 
the administrative village levy 
(maximum rate: 20% of agricultural 
tax/special agricultural tax). 
  To abolish the slaughter tax and 
other related fees. 
 
      To abolish the agricultural tax,   
special agricultural tax (excluding 




village levy  
    To be replaced by the additional 
levy on agricultural taxes. 
 
   To be abolished. 
Township levy 
 
  To  be  abolished.          
 
 
Levy for rural 
education  













“One issue one 
discussion” levy 
To be employed as a substitute for unpaid labor and other local levies. To be 
collected based on democratic discussion by villagers. 
 
Source: see the text. 
  25Table 3 Determinants of Reform Status (Village-Based Probit Estimation) 




Need for, and 
relative ease 
of, reform 
Log of the per capita amount of narrowly defined local 





    
Log of a county’s budgetary fiscal expenditures for rural public 






    
Log of the per capita amount of village expenditure on public 






    
Log of the revenue from a village’s own revenue source, 1998 





    
Log of regional income, 1998 (per capita annual net income 





    




    




    
Observations  781 
 
781 
Pseudo R-squared  0.229 0.232 
 
Source: County budget statistics are compiled from Caizhengbu Yusuansi (1999). 
 
Note: 
The dependent variable represents the status of the taxation reform, where 1 = post-reform villages, 
0 = pre-reform villages. The absolute value of the z statistics are provided in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  26Table 4 Definitions of Taxes and Quasi-Taxes in this Study 
 1995  2002 




1. State taxation on primary industry (agricultural taxes, 
slaughter tax etc.) 
* *  * 
2. State taxation on secondary and tertiary industries 
 
* *  * 
3. Total of state taxation (1+2)  *  *  * 
 
4. Additional levy on agricultural taxes  -- --  * 
 
5. Village levy, township levy, levy for rural education, 
“one issue, one discussion” levy, and other levies 
 
* *  * 
6. Local quasi-tax in the narrow sense (4+5) 
 
* *  * 
7. Unpaid labor 
 
NA *  * 
8. Local quasi-tax in the broader sense (6+7) 
 
NA *  * 
 
Note: *denotes the fact that data are available for the specific year or area. NA denotes the fact that 
the relevant data are not available. -- denotes the fact that the tax or quasi-tax was not applicable for 
the specific year or area. Fines are not included.
  27Table 5a Changes in the Amount and Rate of Taxation, 1995–2002, 
The Whole Area 
 
 1995  2002 










1. State taxation on primary industry  24.5   1.5  43.2   1.7 
2. State taxation (total)  28.1   1.7  47.4   1.8 
3. Local quasi-tax narrowly defined  60.9   3.7  23.4   0.9 
4. Total burden (2 + 3)  89.0   5.4  79.0  3.1 
5. Unpaid labor  U  U  16.5   0.7 
6. Total burden (4 + 5)  U  U  95.6   3.8 
Number of sample counties (households)  106 
(7,668) 
 103  (8,000)   
 
  28Table 5b The Post-reform Counties 
 
 1995  2002 










1. State taxation on primary industry  26.2  1.6  49.2  2.0 
2. State taxation (total)  29.3  1.8  51.6  2.1 
3. Local quasi-tax narrowly defined  69.6 4.2  24.0  1.0 
4. Total burden (2 + 3)  98.9  6.0  83.7  3.4 
5. Unpaid labor  U  U  15.1  0.6 
6. Total burden (4 + 5)  U  U  98.8  4.0 







  29Table 5c The Pre-reform Counties 
 
 1995  2002 










1. State taxation on primary industry  17.6  1.0  22.4  0.8 
2. State taxation (total)  24.3  1.4  32.9  1.1 
3. Local quasi-tax narrowly defined  26.3  1.6  16.3  0.6 
4. Total burden (2 + 3)  50.6  3.0  56.0  1.9 
5. Unpaid labor  U  U  23.3  0.8 
6. Total burden (4 + 5)  U  U  85.4  2.7 







1. The rate of taxation is calculated as (the sum of taxes, levies, and fees/the sum of before-tax 
household income)*100. All the figures relating to taxation in 2002 are deflated to 1995 prices 
using the consumer price index for rural households (nongcun jumin xiaofei jiage zhishu) at the 
provincial level. 
2. Guizhou, Guangxi, and Xinjiang are not included. This is because all tax-related data for 1995 
are missing for Guizhou and because Guangxi and Xinjiang are not covered in the 1995 survey. 
The whole area of 2002 includes two counties (170 households) that contain both pre- and 
post-reform villages. The whole area of 1995 includes counties that are not covered in the 2002 
survey because of changes in administrative units and other changes. 
3. Figures for the total burden in 2002 (line 4) are larger than the sum of state taxation and narrowly 
defined local quasi-tax because small portions of the burden cannot be categorized properly into 
state taxation or local quasi-tax. 
4. U indicates that the relevant data are not available for 1995. NA indicates that the relevant tax 
item is not applicable for 1995. 
  30Table 6a The Redistributive Effect of Taxation in the Post-reform Counties, 1995–2002, 
Total Burden (State Taxation Plus Local Quasi-Tax Narrowly Defined) 
 Years    1995  2002
Gini coefficient for before-tax income 
(initial income)  G  0.357  0.336
Gini coefficient for after-tax income 
(redistribution income)  G*  0.373  0.345
Musgrave and Thin measure  MT (G – G*)   –0.016  –0.009
Redistribution coefficient (%)  MT/G *100  –4.5  –2.6
Kakwani index  P (C – G)  –0.217  –0.226
Concentration index of taxes  C  0.140  0.110
Average rate of taxation of the bottom 
income decile group (%)    t1 10.1  8.3
Average rate of taxation of the top income 
decile group (%)    t10 3.4  1.8
 
  31Table 6b Total State Taxation 
 Years    1995  2002
Gini coefficient of before-tax income  G  0.357  0.336
Gini coefficient of after-tax income  G*  0.360  0.341
Musgrave and Thin measure  MT (G – G*) –0.003  –0.005
Redistribution coefficient (%)  MT/G *100  –0.9  –1.6
Kakwani index  P (C – G)  –0.170  –0.238
Concentration index of taxes  C  0.187  0.098
Average rate of taxation of the bottom 
income decile group (%)  t1  2.3  5.4
Average rate of taxation of the top income 
decile group (%)  t10  1.3  1.0
 
 
  32Table 6c Local Quasi-Tax Narrowly Defined 
 Years    1995  2002
Gini coefficient of before-tax income  G  0.357  0.336
Gini coefficient of after-tax income  G*  0.369  0.339
Musgrave and Thin measure  MT (G – G*) –0.012  –0.003
Redistribution coefficient (%)  MT/G *100  –3.3  –0.8
Kakwani index  P (C – G)  –0.237  –0.265
Concentration index of taxes  C  0.120  0.071
Average rate of taxation of the bottom 
income decile group (%)  t1  7.9  2.3
Average rate of taxation of the top income 
decile group (%)  t10  2.1  0.4
 
Note: All the figures are based on Table 5. 
 
  33Table 7 A Comparison of the Redistributive Effect of Taxation in Post- and Pre- reform Counties, 
2002 (State Taxation Plus Local Quasi-Tax Broadly Defined, Including Unpaid Labor) 






Gini coefficient of before-tax income 





Total burden (state taxation plus local quasi-tax broadly defined) 
Gini coefficient of after-tax income 





Redistribution coefficient (%)  –2.9  –2.2  –2.7
Kakwani index  –0.217  –0.294  –0.238
Local quasi-tax broadly defined       
Gini coefficient of after-tax income  0.339 0.392  0.360 
Redistribution coefficient (%)  –1.2  –1.9 –1.3
Kakwani index  –0.233  –0.507  –0.282
Unpaid labor       
Gini coefficient of after-tax income  0.336 0.389 0.357 
Redistribution coefficient (%)  –0.4 –1.3  –0.6
Kakwani index  –0.193  –0.604  –0.327
 
Note: All the figures are based on Table 5. 
  34Table 8 The Redistributive Impact of Primary Industry Taxes on Agricultural Income in the 
Post-reform Counties, 1995–2002 
 Years    1995  2002
Gini coefficient for before-tax agricultural 
income G  0.386  0.430
Gini coefficient for after-tax agricultural 
income G*  0.391  0.438
Musgrave and Thin measure  MT (G – G*) –0.006  –0.008
Redistribution coefficient (%)  MT/G *100  –1.5  –2.0
Kakwani index  P (C – G)  –0.219  –0.194
Concentration index of taxes*  C  0.167  0.236
Average rate of taxation of the bottom 
income decile group (%)  t1 11.3  18.9
Average rate of taxation of the top income 
decile group (%)  t10  1.4  2.4
 
Note: All the figures are based on Table 5. 
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Table 9 Intraregional and Interregional Income Elasticity of Taxation in the Post-reform Counties, 
1995–2002 
 1995    2002 






















        
Log of regional income (per capita before-tax 









        










        
Observations  6,113 6,113  6,209  6,209 
Adjusted R-squared  0.211 0.261  0.215  0.189 
 
Note: 
Dependent variables are the logs of the per capita amount of state taxation and narrowly defined 
local quasi-tax. The province dummy and the constant are not reported. The absolute values of t 
statistics are provided in parentheses. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at the 
5% and the 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 10 The Redistributive Impact of Taxation in Post-reform Provinces, 1995–2002 





coefficient for state 
taxation on primary 
industry (%) 
Redistribution 
coefficient for total 
amount of state 
taxation (%) 
Redistribution 




coefficient for total 
burden (total state 
taxation plus local 
quasi-tax narrowly 
defined) (%) 
                  1995  2002 
   
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
Hebei                0.316  0.298 –0.2 –2.1 –0.04 –1.6 –2.9 –1.2 –3.0 –3.1
Jilin               
               
               
               
               
             
               
               
               
               
0.343  0.302 –2.5 –3.1 –2.7 –3.1 –7.1 –1.2 –10.3 –4.7
Jiangsu 0.312  0.306 –0.4 –1.3 –0.4 –1.4 –3.0 –0.4 –3.4 –2.2
Anhui 0.216  0.266 –1.6 –2.1 –1.5 –1.7 –3.3 –0.7 –4.9 –2.5
Jiangxi 0.236  0.282 0.3 –1.1 1.2 –1.1 0.1 –0.7 1.1 –1.7
Shandong
 
0.453  0.340 –1.0 –1.9 –1.1 –1.9 –7.4 –1.3 –8.9 –3.3
Henan 0.245  0.267 –1.0 –3.0 –0.8 –3.0 –3.4 –0.9 –4.3 –4.2
Hubei 0.281  0.287 –2.8 –1.4 –2.9 –1.4 –10.4 –1.4 –14.3 –2.8
Hunan 0.256  0.317 –0.8 –1.0 –0.6 –1.0 0.6 –0.6 –0.2 –1.5
Shaanxi 0.270  0.304 –0.2 –2.8 –0.1 –2.8 –1.0 –1.4 –1.3 –4.7
Gansu 0.314  0.339 –1.1 –0.5 –1.2 –0.6 0.1 –0.4 –1.1 –1.2
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Table 11 Changes in the Rate of Taxation in Selected Post-reform Provinces, 1995–2002 
 
  Hebei Hunan Shaanxi Jiangxi
Average rate of taxation (%)  1995  2002  1995  2002  1995  2002  1995  2002 
Total  burden              
The bottom 10% income decile group  10.4  11.7  3.4  4.3  5.4  13.5  4.6  4.7 
The top 10% income decile group  4.4  2.0  6.9  2.4  6.3  2.0  8.8  1.8 
Total  average                  4.2 2.9 6.6 3.5 5.6 4.3 5.4 3.0
Local quasi-tax narrowly defined                 
The bottom 10% income decile group  9.6  3.5  1.6  1.2  2.7  3.2  3.2  1.3 
The top 10% income decile group  3.1  0.2  5.1  0.6  3.2  0.6  5.0  0.6 
Total  average  3.5                0.7 4.5 1.1 3.1 1.2 3.4 1.0Appendix A The Distribution of Sample Villages and Counties by the Status of Taxation Reform, 
in the 2002 Data Set 
    Number of counties 
Reform status  Province  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Total 
C Beijing  1  1  2 
A Hebei    0  5  5 
C Shanxi  5  1  6 
C Liaoning  5  1  6 
A Jilin  0  6  6 
B Jiangsu  0  5  5 
B Zhejiang    4  2  6 
A Anhui    0  5  5 
A Jiangxi    0  6  6 
A Shandong    1  6  7 
A Henan  0  7  7 
A Hubei    0  6  6 
A Hunan    0  5  5 
B Guangdong  4  3  7 
C Guangxi    5  0  5 
A Chongqing    0  2  2 
A Sichuan    0  6  6 
A Guizhou    0  6  6 
C Yunnan  5  0  5 
A Shaanxi    0  6  6 
A Gansu    0  5  5 
C Xinjiang    8  0  8 
 Total  38  84  122 
Note:  The first column (“Reform status”) indicates the status of the rural taxation reform in 2002. A and B denote 
post-reform provinces. Status A provinces have implemented the reform in all or most of the counties after receiving 
subsidies from the central budget. Status B provinces have implemented the reform in all or most of the counties 
without receiving subsidies from the central budget. Status C denotes pre-reform provinces, that is, provinces where 
the reform has been implemented only in parts of the counties with or without subsidies from central budget. Provinces 
not included in the sampling frame are Tianjin (status C), Inner Mongolia (status A), Heilongjiang (status A), Shanghai 
(status B), Fujian (status C), Hainan (status C), Ningxia (status A), Qinghai (status A), and Tibet (not included in the 
scheme of rural taxation reform). Based on the administrative village survey, three counties contain both pre-reform 
and post-reform villages. They are Xiaoshan County in Zhejiang (official administrative unit code: 330121), Licheng 
district in Shandong (370112), and Akesu County in Xinjiang (652901). As the reform status of each village is 
consistent with the other information in the administrative village questionnaire, we placed the three counties in 
pre-reform category. 
  39Appendix B Chronology of the “rural tax and fee reform,” 1980–2005 
1980  • The fiscal contract (shouzhi qufen fenji baogan) system is introduced. 
 
1985  • The Ministry of Finance issued the “township budget administration act” (Xiangzhen caizheng 
guanli zanxing banfa).” The township government budget as the lowest public budget was 
basically established throughout the rural area by the mid-1990s.   
 
• The party (Communist party of China) distributed a directive on the reform of the education 
system (“Guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding”), which gave main responsibility for basic 
education to local governments and allowed it to collect a local levy for education.  
 
1990  •The state council distributed instructions to alleviate peasants' tax and fee burden (Guanyu 
qieshi jianqing nongmin fudan de tongzhi) (February). 
 
1991  •The state council laid down a new regulation of the highest limit of township and village levies, 
that is, less than 5% of the per capita net income of the previous year (December). 
 
1993  •The party and the state council distributed urgent instructions on the alleviation of peasants' tax 
and fee burden (Guanyu qieshi jianqing nongmin fudan de jinji tongzhi)(March). 
 
•The state council held a conference on the alleviation of peasants’ burden and abolished 
thirty-seven fees/compulsory investments imposed by central/local governments.  
 
•The “agricultural law” (nongye fa), which classified legal taxes and fees, was enacted. Taxes 
and fees designated by the law are state taxes, village levy (cun tiliu), township levy 
(xiangzhen tongchou), and unpaid labor (yiwugong, laodong jileigong). The law declared 
peasants have the right to reject other fees, donations, or penalties forced by village, township, 
or other governmental agencies (July).   
 
•An experiment of rural taxation reform was started in Anhui. The point of the reform was to 
make substantive enactments on legal local quasi-taxes and fees. 
 
1994  •“Tax sharing system” (fenshuizhi), a sweeping reform of the tax system, was initiated. 
Agricultural tax was classified into local tax mainly used for financing county and township 
budgets. 
 
1996  •The party and the state council issued the “Decision on completing the work in earnest to 
alleviate the peasants' burden” (Guanyu qieshi zuohao jianqing nongmin fudan gongzuo de 
jueding) (December).  
 
  401997 
 
•The party and the state council served an injunction that the level of township/village levies for 
1998–2000 should not exceed the level of 1997. 
1998  •The Leading Small-group (lingdao xiaozu) for rural taxation reform headed by the minister of 
finance was established in the party (September).     
•The third plenum of the Fifteenth
 Communist Party Central Committee deliberated on the 
“decision on several critical issues on agriculture and rural works” (Zhonggong zhongyang 
guanyu nongye he nongcun gongzuo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding). The committee 
decided to alleviate the peasants' tax and fee burden through the gradual reform of the rural tax 
system (October). 
 
1999  • The state council issued a directive to inspect the government’s work for alleviation of the 




• The state council endorsed the report of the Leading Small-group (lindao xiaozu) for the rural 
taxation reform and decided the rate of agricultural tax (7%) and the additional levy for 
agricultural tax (maximum of  20% of the agricultural tax) (January). 
 
•The party and the state council served an injunction that the level of township/village levies until 
2002 should not exceed the level of 1997. The Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance 
submitted a report on the alleviation of peasants' burden jointly with the other central 
government departments.  
 
• The party and the state council issued the “Instruction on conducting the rural tax and fee 
reform in designated model areas” (Guanyu Jinxing Nongcun Shuifei Gaige Shidian Gongzuo 
de Tongzhi). According to this instruction, the entire Anhui province was designated as the 
national model area (shidian) of rural taxation reform. Several counties in other provinces 
were also designated as model areas of the reform by the provincial governments (March).  
 
2001  • The state council held a conference to summarize the experiences in model areas of rural 
taxation reform (February).  
 
• The state council distributed two instructions on rural taxation reform in 2001, which 
emphasized that the reform should implement gradually and cautiously (wenbu shishi) and 
that the model area should not be expanded without the approval of the state council. The 
instructions also detailed that the reform program should be formulated by provincial 
governments, not by the central government (March–April).  
 
• The state council introduced a new county-based administration system of basic education, 
which requires the county budget to take responsibility for ensuring teachers' wages (May).  
 
  412002  •The administrative offices of the state council distributed an instruction as to the rural taxation 
reform in 2002, which declared the expansion of coverage of reform into twenty provinces 
(Guanyu zuohao 2002 nian kuoda nongcun shuifei gaige shidian gongzuo de tongzhi). The 
instruction stressed “three important things” (sange quebao) needed to take place after the 
reform, that is, to make sure the  peasants’ burden was alleviated (and to prevent reactional 
increase of burden in the forthcoming years), to make sure the normal operation of township 
and village level governmental apparatus continued, and to make sure that sufficient funds for 
rural education were available. It also promised central budget’s subsidy to provincial and 
county governments for the decrease in local budgets (March).  
 
2003  •The state council distributed a directive on rural taxation reform that recognizes the difficulty of 
"making sure that three important things” (sange quebao) take place (Guanyu quanmian tuijin 
nongcun shuifei gaige shidian de yijian). The directive emphasized that the reform should not 
be implemented in a hasty manner. At the same time, the directive required the gradual 
abolishment of the special agricultural tax in the model areas of taxation reform (June). 
 
• The third plenum of the sixteenth
 CPC central committee issued a communique on "the 
improvement of the socialist market economic system” (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu wanshan 
shehuizhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding). It required the promotion of 
comprehensive taxation reform programs—the abolishment of a special agricultural tax, the 
restructuring of county/township administrative apparatus, and reform of the rural compulsory 
education system—in model areas of taxation reform. It also declared gradual reduction of 
agricultural tax rate (October). 
 
2004  ɾ The party distributed the "Central document Number One (Zhonggong Zhongyang Yihao 
Wenjian)", which stated that the rate of agricultural taxes should be gradually reduced (one 
percent in national average for 2004) and declared that special agricultural tax excluding 
special tax for tobacco should be abolished (January). 
 
ɾ The prime minister Wen Jiabao declared in the annual report on central government activities 
that the agricultural tax rate should be gradually reduced by one percent every year and that 
agricultural taxes should be abolished within the next five years (March).  
 
ɾ The party decided to stop collecting agricultural taxes in Heilongjiang and Jilin. The party also 
declared that the agricultural tax rate should be reduced by 3 percent in 11 major grain 
producing provinces (Hebei, Neimenggu, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan) and 1 percent in other provinces. The additional levy for 
agricultural taxes is also to be reduced gradually.  
ɾ In 2004, agricultural taxes are basically stopped to collect in 8 provinces (Shanghai, Xizang, 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang, and Fujian). 
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ɾAccording to the official household survey by NBS, per capita annual tax burden of rural 
household in 2004 is 38 yuan (30 yuan less than the previous year, decreased by 44.3 percent). 
The proportion of tax burden to net annual household income is 1.3 percent (2.6 percent in the 
previous year). 
 
2005  •The party and the state council distributed a document on rural works (Zhonggong zhongyang 
guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang nongcun gongzuo tigao nongye zonghe shengchan nengli 
ruogan zhengce de yijian) It declared to continue "two exemptions and three subsidies (“䖍䁌
еeɧ㷼贴)" (liang jianmian san butie) policy: Exemption and reduction of agricultural tax and 
abolition of special agricultural tax excluding taxation on tobacco; introduction of direct subsidy 
for grain farming, subsidy for high quality seeds, and subsidy for purchase of agricultural 
machinery (January).  
 
ɾAccording to the official household survey by NBS, per capita annual tax burden of rural 
household in the first half of 2005 is six yuan (six yuan less than the previous year, decreased 
by 50 percent). The proportion of tax burden to net annual household income is 1.3 percent 
(2.6 percent in the previous year). 
 
ɾ By September 2005, 28 provinces had abolished agricultural taxes. Many counties in three 
other provinces (Hebei, Shandong, Yunnan) also stopped collecting agricultural taxes in 2005. 
 
ɾ On December 24 the State Council distributed the directive on the financing of rural 
compulsory education (Guanyu Shenhua Nongcun Yiwu Jiaoyu Jingfei Baozhang Jizhi de 
Tongzhi). The directive declared that the central government will invest 218,200 million yuan 
for rural compulsory education to make sure that "all children of peasants can attend school". 
 
ɾ On December 29, 2005, the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress voted that 
agricultural taxes should be abolished on January 1, 2006.   
 
ɾ "Agricultural tax has become history (People’s Daily, December 31, 2005). The post 
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1 “Agricultural taxes” is used as the general term for state taxation on agriculture 
such as the agricultural tax (nongye shui), the special agricultural tax (nongye 
techan shui), and the livestock tax (muye shui). 
2 See Gustafsson, Li, and Terry (forthcoming) for the detailed illustration of the 
household survey. As for the description of the village survey, see Sato 
(forthcoming). The surveys on which this paper based on were funded by the Ford 
Foundation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Asian 
Development Bank, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, the Grant in Aid for 
Scientific Research of the Japan Society of the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and 
Hitotsubashi University. The authors are grateful for their generous support. 
3 Tao, Liu, and Zhang (2003) have used panel data for rural households compiled 
from the Fixed Observation Points of Rural Economy of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
4 Other issues will be investigated in our ongoing research. 
5 In our discussion of the process of the reform, we draw on the following references: 
“Caijing” Bianjibu (2003); Chen (2003); Guowuyuan Nongcun Shuifei Gaige 
Gongzuoxiaozu Bangongshi, ed. (2002); Guo (2003); He and Sun (2000); Ma 
(2002); Teng (2003); Zhejiang Sheng Caizhengting Ketizu (2003); Electronic 
Archive of the Ministry of Agriculture (Zhongguo Nongye Xinxiwang) 
(http://www.agri.gov.cn/zcfg/); People’s Daily [Renmin Ribao] and Economic 
Daily [Jingji Ribao], various volumes. See Appendix B for detailed chronology of 
taxation reform.  
6 The newly defined taxation formula for the agricultural tax (T) is as follows:T = 
A*Y*p*r. A denotes taxable acreage (jishui mianji), based on the acreage of 
cultivated land fixed in the second round of the household responsibility contract in 
the 1990s, Y denotes the normal yield (changnian chanliang) per unit land of 
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agricultural products, based on average yields over the five years before 1998, p 
denotes the taxable price of agricultural products (jishui jiage), based on a mix of 
the market price and the government’s protected price, and r denotes the tax rate.  
7 Note that state taxation here refers to formal taxes collected by either the central 
government or local governments. The agricultural taxes are categorized under 
“local taxes” (difangshui), rather than “national taxes” (guoshui), as the funds 
collected belong to local governments under the current tax-sharing system. 
8 Fines for violations of family planning and other policies are not included because 
their redistributive impact is not large.  
9 For instance, the before-tax income of two persons, A and B, is 100 and 50, 
respectively. If A pays 75 for income tax and B pays nothing, the after-tax income 
for A and B is 25 and 50, respectively, and the Gini coefficient is the same for 
before-tax income. In this case, MT is 0, from which it is concluded that the tax is 
neutral. However, in reality, a highly progressive taxation system exists. We will 
elaborate on the measurement of tax regressivity in forthcoming papers. 
10 This outcome does not change significantly when the sum of taxes and levies 
minus the sum of public transfers (cash or in-kind incomes from villages, 
townships, and upper governments) is used. Measurements of the redistributive 
impact for the net peasant burden are as follows. The redistribution coefficient was 
–4.3 percent in 1995 and –2.5 percent in 2002. The Kakwani index was –0.218 in 
1995 and –0.226 in 2002. 
11 In a forthcoming paper, we conduct a simulation of the redistributive impact of the 
abolition of agricultural taxes. 
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